Security Posture — 2026-11-07
Dated, self-assessed security and FIPS 140-3 posture: internal gates, external penetration-test status, scope checklist, and open items; base assessment 2026-10-18, hardening sections dated.
On this page
This page records the security assessment posture of the SveltyCMS repository. The base assessment is dated 2026-10-18; controls shipped after that date are listed in the dated hardening sections below, most recently 2026-11-07. It is a factual status page, not a certificate, an audit report, or a marketing claim. Where a control has not been independently verified, this page says so.
The internal gates below are self-assessed by the project. They fail when a named control regresses, but they are rule-based and regression-based; they do not replace an independent assessment of a running deployment.
Assessment status
| Assessment | Status as of 2026-10-18 | What it is and where it runs |
|---|---|---|
| Internal static analysis | Run for this revision | bun run risk:audit runs scan-security-risk, scan-secret-misuse, slop-scanner, the tenant-isolation API lint, bun audit, and scan-osv. The full gate runs in the pre-commit hook (.githooks/pre-commit); CI runs the dependency-audit, secret-misuse, and tenant-isolation jobs separately. CodeQL security-extended runs weekly and on demand. |
| Internal dynamic gates | Run for this revision | bun run test:security is the security-focused Vitest subset (hooks, authorization, media/SVG, SSRF/egress, GraphQL, WAF, audit chain, field-write guard, WebAuthn, SSO metadata). It is part of bun run test:unit in the pre-commit hook and the CI unit job. tests/integration/api/security-negative.test.ts runs on the CI database matrix. |
| External penetration test | Not performed | No dated penetration test by a party outside the project exists as of 2026-10-18. An external test is required before enterprise GA and is tracked as the “Third-Party Security Audit” roadmap item. |
The internal rows above describe checks in this repository. They are not a substitute for the external row, and a clean scanner run does not close it.
FIPS 140-3 posture
SveltyCMS does not claim FIPS 140-3 validation. The repository does not ship a validated cryptographic module, does not provide a FIPS-approved service indicator, and does not assert that its cryptographic operations run inside a validated boundary.
A FIPS-enabled OpenSSL provider on the operator’s host and a FIPS-validated application are different claims:
- Operator runtime property. The operator may run Node.js or the
opensslCLI with a FIPS provider installed and enabled. That describes the host’s OpenSSL configuration. - Application validation. Validation applies to a specific cryptographic module under a defined operational environment, with an approved service indicator and the operator controls that maintain the validated configuration. Enabling a provider does not, by itself, validate the application or the way it calls the module.
An operator can inspect the runtime with:
node -p "process.versions.openssl"
openssl list -providers
process.versions.openssl reports the OpenSSL version the Node runtime was built against. It does not report whether a validated provider is active. openssl list -providers lists the providers available to the openssl binary on PATH, which may differ from the OpenSSL runtime embedded in Node. A provider labelled fips is evidence of the operator’s configuration, not evidence that SveltyCMS is validated.
A validated deployment requires all of the following, and they sit outside this repository:
- A cryptographic module validated under FIPS 140-3 (a current CMVP certificate for the exact module and version).
- An approved service indicator showing that the module is operating in its approved mode for the relevant operations.
- Operational controls that preserve the validated configuration: key management, access control, configuration management, audit and monitoring, and the personnel and physical controls required by the operator’s accreditation scope.
An operator can build such a deployment around a validated runtime. That validation belongs to the operator’s deployment and accreditation scope; it is not a SveltyCMS product claim.
What is covered internally
These checks are self-assessed, not certified. They are useful because they are reproducible in the repository, and they are limited to the rules and regressions they contain.
| Gate | What it covers | Where it runs |
|---|---|---|
bun run risk:audit |
The six-check umbrella: static risk scan, secret-misuse scan, slop scanner, tenant-isolation API lint, bun audit, and OSV.dev. |
Pre-commit hook; CI runs the individual dependency, secret, and tenant jobs. |
bun run test:security |
Security regressions for hooks, authentication, authorization, tenant-scoped file serving, collection read/write lanes, egress guard, SVG/SSRF handling, GraphQL, WAF, audit-ledger integrity, field-write guards, WebAuthn ceremonies, and SSO session metadata. | Local run; included in the CI unit job. |
scan-security-risk |
Static AST scan over src for injection classes across all four adapters, command execution, path traversal, SSRF, privilege-field writes, SVG stream bypass, and XSS sinks. |
risk:audit in pre-commit. |
scan-secret-misuse |
Hardcoded credentials and comparison backdoors. | Pre-commit and CI secret-misuse job. |
slop-scanner |
XSS, RTL, and security architecture rules. | risk:audit in pre-commit. |
scan-osv |
Dependency advisories from OSV.dev (GHSA, NVD, and other feeds). | risk:audit in pre-commit. |
tests/unit/security/crypto-inventory.test.ts |
Pins application crypto parameters: primitives, key/IV lengths, Argon2id cost, WebAuthn algorithms, and API-key hashing. A change to any pinned value must update the test and the documentation in the same changeset. | Unit suite and CI. |
| Crypto-agility suites | key-ring (v2 key IDs, rotation ring, v1 reads), hybrid-kem (ML-KEM-768 envelope), cloud-kms (multi-cloud KMS envelope encryption with in-memory DEK caching), and checksum-profile (SHA-384/512 + legacy SHA-256). |
Unit suite and CI. |
| Enterprise SSO federation | SAML 2.0 SP implementation (@node-saml/node-saml), one-click public provider discovery, RFC 7636 PKCE, JIT provisioning, and RP-initiated logout. |
Unit suite (saml-sso-federation, sso-session, saml) and CI. |
| Quantum security analysis | Current algorithms, what Grover/Shor would affect, and the post-quantum roadmap. It is an analysis, not a certification. | Reviewed quarterly with the crypto inventory. |
Hardening added 2026-11-05
These controls shipped after the 2026-10-18 assessment. They are covered by unit regressions (listed) and have not yet been exercised by the external test this page still lists as open:
| Control | Implementation | Regression |
|---|---|---|
| DNS-pinned egress (SSRF + DNS rebinding) | validateEgressUrl() resolves the hostname, checks every address, then pins the validated IP for the connection so the second resolution cannot be rebound to loopback/metadata. Redirect hops are re-validated. |
tests/unit/security/egress-guard.test.ts |
| Revocation epoch | Global/tenant/user monotonic counters reject a session token with one integer comparison; password change, 2FA reset, and admin lockout bump the epoch before responding. | tests/unit/auth/revocation-epoch.test.ts |
| Ahead-of-time validation plans | Collection schemas compile to a flat validator plan cached in a WeakMap; writes execute the plan instead of re-walking the schema, and unknown keys are rejected before reaching an adapter. |
tests/unit/sdk/compiled-validation-plan.test.ts |
| Nonce-based strict-dynamic CSP | vite.config.ts configures csp.mode: "nonce"; SvelteKit adds a fresh nonce to every inline script and src/app.html opts the theme bootstrap in with %sveltekit.nonce%. |
tests/unit/hooks/csp-headers.test.ts |
| Ephemeral key-material zeroing | DEK/KEK and plaintext buffers are wiped in finally in hybrid-kem, field-encryption, share-link-hash, and hmacSha256VerifyWithKeys. |
tests/unit/utils/field-encryption.test.ts, tests/unit/media/sharing.test.ts |
| WASM plugin sandbox (marketplace code) | Third-party plugins run in WasmPluginPool with a 128 MB global ceiling, linear-memory zeroing, 500-run recycling, and pointer-bounded host ABIs; first-party core plugins stay on the native JS path. |
tests/unit/plugins/wasm-plugin-pool.test.ts, tests/unit/plugins/post-write-wasm-dual-track.test.ts |
Hardening added 2026-11-07
Shipped after a code-path review of competitor advisories and two independent read-only audits. Each row is covered by the named regression; none has been exercised by the external test this page still lists as open.
| Control | Implementation | Regression | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Privilege-change session revocation | A patch touching role/roles/roleIds/isAdmin/permissions/blocked invalidates the permission cache, purges every stored session (LRU + store + DB row), and publishes a user revocation epoch plus a shared-cache marker. The session-cache hit path re-checks the epoch, so a warm snapshot cannot outlive the change. OIDC syncRolesOnLogin uses the same path. |
tests/unit/api/user.test.ts, tests/unit/auth/sessions/session-cookies.test.ts, tests/unit/api/rbac-endpoint-integration.test.ts |
||
__Host--only session cookie in secure mode |
Secure contexts read only the __Host- cookie; the plain and __Secure- names are dev-only fallbacks, so a Domain= cookie planted by a sibling subdomain is ignored. path=/ is forced for the prefixed cookie, and the rate-limit tier peek follows the same rule. |
tests/unit/auth/sessions/session-cookies.test.ts, tests/benchmarks/security-utils.test.ts |
||
| Avatar upload boundary | The self-service avatar route requires media:write for the upload branch, accepts only an image, and stores only a site file path (`/files |
media | mediaFolder/…`) or a base64 image data URL with a length cap. The alias route applies the same checks. | tests/unit/api/user.test.ts |
| Media version-upload branch parity | executeUploadNewVersion validates the declared MIME before every branch; each branch sniffs the header, calls assertMimeAgreement, enforces the upload allowlist, and rejects SVG content including the <svg polyglot probe. Failures are 415, and the row stores the verified type and written byte count. |
tests/unit/api/media-security.test.ts, tests/unit/api/media-security-critical.test.ts |
||
/files/ response policy |
MIME parameters are normalized, so text/html; charset=utf-8 cannot bypass the attachment branch. HTML/XHTML/XML/JavaScript/CSS are served as attachment with default-src 'none'; sandbox and nosniff; cloud mode refuses a redirect for those types instead of delegating the headers to the bucket. |
tests/unit/media/files-route-transform.test.ts, tests/unit/api/media-security.test.ts |
||
| Public-form upload exclusion | Anonymous /api/forms submissions drop File/Blob values recursively (arrays and nested objects), using a duck-typed check instead of instanceof, so the widget pipeline cannot store media as the system user. |
tests/unit/api/forms-security.test.ts |
||
| REST filter type coercion | Query-string filter leaves are coerced to the declared field type (boolean, number) at the validateFilter boundary; an unrepresentable value is 400 FILTER_INVALID_VALUE instead of an adapter-dependent silent miss or inverted MariaDB row. Logical groups and operator operands are walked; the input is not mutated. |
tests/unit/security/filter-coercion.test.ts |
||
| Relation-target read policy | Populated relations are fetched with the caller’s publication filter, ownership rule and ACCESSRULES, and target rows are redacted with the target schema before `_populated*` is attached. The shared relation cache is skipped for unprivileged callers when a constraint applies, so a cached draft cannot bypass the policy. | tests/unit/sdk/populate-policy.test.ts (redaction, admin bypass, published clamp, cache skip) |
||
| Nested guarded-field recursion | fieldDeclaresGuardDeep() walks group/repeater children; the schema hot flag, the guarded-filter blocker and the read redactor (including repeater arrays) use it, so team.salary is hidden and filter[team.salary] is rejected. |
tests/unit/security/nested-field-guards.test.ts |
||
| Tenant-scope lint gate | scripts/lint/lint-tenant-scope.ts fails an unconditional withSystemScope() spread next to a live tenantId (the bug class that shipped twice in content reads). It runs inside bun run check (the 18-entry fast-check suite) and has a bootstrap allowlist for setup/E2E seeders. |
tests/unit/scripts/lint-tenant-scope.test.ts |
Propagation note (updated 2026-11-09): role and block changes now also publish a user revocation marker to the shared cache, which the session-cache hit path reads with a 5-second per-user memo. Global and tenant revocation epochs and the permission/session LRUs are still process-local; a multi-node deployment should not describe them as cluster-wide until the outbox/Redis propagation is wired. The synchronous per-IP L1 flood gate was removed in PR #565 (e5343a933) because it capped legitimate bulk writes; the adaptive lane limiter, tenant ceiling and WAF remain.
What an external test should cover
An external penetration test should target a running deployment, not just the repository. The engagement scope should include at least:
- Authentication, session management, 2FA, SAML, and OIDC flows, including logout and session revocation.
- Authorization and tenant isolation, including cross-tenant object references and row-ownership checks.
- Media upload and SVG handling, including polyglot files, content-type confusion, and storage paths.
- SSRF and egress controls, including redirects and remote URL fetching.
- API keys and token lifecycle: creation, storage, rotation, revocation, and hashing.
- Backup and restore, including artifact encryption and separation of backup keys.
- Plugin sandboxing and plugin workspace isolation.
- Migration tooling, including import paths, schema changes, and data exposure during migration.
The output should be a dated report with reproducible findings, severity, affected versions, and retest results.
Known limitations and open items
- No external penetration test. As of 2026-10-18 there is no dated report from an independent party. This is the primary open item and the reason the assessment status table does not mark the external row as complete.
- No application-level FIPS 140-3 claim. An operator’s FIPS-enabled OpenSSL provider does not validate the application, and this repository does not provide a validated module or service indicator.
- Crypto agility is partially shipped. Key-ID envelopes (
v2+*_KEY_RING), the hybrid ML-KEM primitive (opt-in for backups viaPQC_HYBRID_BACKUPS=true), and the optional SHA-384/SHA-512 checksum profile are implemented. Remaining: wire fields/settings/TOTP to the hybrid envelope and document a re-wrap/rollback runbook. See the cryptographic-agility roadmap item and the quantum security analysis. - Crypto is reviewed quarterly. The primitives and parameters are pinned by
tests/unit/security/crypto-inventory.test.ts; changes to those values require a documentation update in the same changeset. - Internal gates have a defined scope. The scanners and regression tests cover the rules they contain. They do not search for vulnerability classes those rules do not describe, and they are not a substitute for an external assessment.
Disclosure
Report suspected vulnerabilities through either channel:
- Email: security@sveltycms.com
- GitHub: Security advisories (private report form)
The project aims to reply within 48 hours and to fix critical issues within 7 days. The full staged timeline is in SECURITY.md and the incident response page. For a report, include affected version/branch, reproduction steps, impact, and any proof of concept.
Review cadence
The next scheduled review is 2027-01-31, or earlier on a material security change such as a crypto primitive or parameter change, an authentication or authorization boundary change, a tenant-isolation change, or a disclosure-policy change.
Cryptography is reviewed quarterly independent of this page. The quantum security analysis records the current algorithms and the post-quantum roadmap; the OWASP ASVS matrix records the internal control mapping. Neither is a certificate, and neither closes the external-test item.