Enterprise Tenancy & Data-Isolation Inventory
Verified map of every tenant enforcement point — request resolution, REST, GraphQL, SDK, media, search, export, jobs, caches, sessions — with the file:line where isolation is enforced or can be bypassed.
On this page
Status: current audit of
next. The baseline snapshot wasefa57c55eon the (now deleted)fix/enterprise-readiness-20261110branch; PR #566 is merged and every row below was re-verified against the current tree, so a reference that moved cites the symbol. Per-finding status is listed below — entries marked fixed are no longer current defects and must not be read as open risks. Rows without a reachable call site keep theirnot foundresult and the search behind it. Re-verified 2026-11-11 on the current tree: the status and evidence of every row this pass touched were checked against the code again; references that moved cite the symbol.
| Finding | Status | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
GraphQL data operations accepted a caller-supplied tenantId (15 fields) |
Fixed in PR #566 (commit 26dc6ce65) |
resolveGraphQLTenant() in resolvers/data-operations.ts; tests/unit/api/graphql-tenant-scope.test.ts |
Tenant context does not fail closed at the request hook (locals.tenantId = null continues) |
Fixed in PR #566 (commit c727d45b7) |
assertTenantRequired() in tenant-required.server.ts, applied in the catch-all dispatcher and at 5 hook boundaries; tests/unit/security/tenant-fail-closed.test.ts (13 tests) |
PostgreSQL RLS implemented but unwired (enforceTenantPolicy, getTenantPool/setTenantPool had no callers) |
Fixed — opt-in, wired | TENANT_RLS_ENABLED=true makes createModel() provision ENABLE + FORCE + tenant_isolation and throws when the policy cannot filter (src/databases/postgresql/adapter-core.ts); tenant-scoped db.crud.* calls run in a transaction that binds app.tenant_id (src/databases/core/rls-scoped-crud.ts, composed at boot in src/databases/db.ts); transaction({ tenantId }) passes the tenant per call instead of reading process state. Proof against a non-owner role (pool reuse, concurrent tenants, cross-tenant writes rejected): tests/integration/databases/tenant-rls-request-path.test.ts. Still true: system paths carry no tenant and need a BYPASSRLS role, and setTenantPool still has no boot caller. |
FTS adapter scopes by ambient currentTenantId without assertTenantContext |
Still open (PostgreSQL; MariaDB lost the ambient fallback) | postgresql/fts-adapter.ts:321-329, :445-453; mariadb/fts-adapter.ts:155-168 |
tenant-isolation.test.ts accepted 200 or 401 and skipped its leak assertion unless 200 |
Fixed in PR #566 (commit c727d45b7) |
cross-tenant read must be 401/403, or 200 with an explicitly empty tenant-B slice; DB-less runs skip with a reason |
This page records where tenant isolation is actually enforced on branch next (baseline snapshot efa57c55e). It is an inventory, not a design document: each row points at the line that does the work, and each gap points at the line where a caller can step around it.
Evidence rule. Every statement carries
path:line. A capability that could not be located is written as not found, together with the search that was run. A config key, a UI label or a doc comment is not evidence of enforcement — only a line on the request/query execution path counts. Method (2026-11-10). Read-only audit of the worktree. No source file, config or test was modified, nothing was committed, and no suite was executed (the host was running a performance benchmark). Coverage below is read from the test files and from thepackage.jsonsuite definitions, not from a run.
1. How tenant context is established per request
| Step | Where | What it does |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Mode flag | src/utils/tenant-isolation.server.ts:33-52 |
MULTI_TENANT (or DEMO) read through a 5 s cache. A settings read error resolves to false (:47-49) — fail-closed in the safe direction, but it means a transient settings failure silently disables isolation. |
| 2. Pipeline order | src/hooks.server.ts:813-834 (READY), :770-787 (API_WRITE), :792-811 (API_READ) |
security → system-state → turbo-get → compression → authentication → authorization → local-context → api-requests. Tenant binding happens inside authentication. |
| 3. Hostname derivation | src/utils/tenant.ts:35-48 |
localhost, 127.0.0.1 and 192.168.* → literal "default" (:39); a host with ≥3 labels → first label lowercased (:44-46); a bare two-label host → null (:47). |
4. Hook binds locals.tenantId |
src/hooks/handle-authentication.ts:1197-1208 |
When MULTI_TENANT or demo, locals.tenantId = getTenantIdFromHostname(url.hostname, true); the test-mode worker header can overwrite it (:1204-1207). |
| 5. Test-only override | src/hooks/request-tenant.ts:23-35 |
x-test-tenant-id / x-tenant-id honoured only when TEST_MODE or PLAYWRIGHT_TEST (:28), charset-validated (:21), literal "null" rejected (:30). |
| 6. Session tenant adopted | src/hooks/handle-authentication.ts:1413-1416 |
If no tenant was resolved, the authenticated user’s tenantId is adopted; same fallback on the two turbo-auth fast paths (:1103-1108, :1151-1156). |
| 7. Bound adapter | src/databases/tenant-adapter.ts:144-158 |
bindRequestDbAdapter() wraps the raw adapter in forTenant() only when multiTenant && tenantId; otherwise the raw adapter is exposed (:157). |
| 8. Adapter GUC / pool hint | src/databases/tenant-adapter.ts:165-185 |
applyAdapterTenantContext() calls setTenantContext() on the raw adapter (skips on no-op, :178-180). |
| 9. Dispatcher backstop | src/routes/api/[...path]/+server.ts:395-409 |
Adopts user.tenantId when locals.tenantId is empty; requests with neither stay tenantless. |
| 10. Super-admin override | src/routes/api/[...path]/+server.ts:412-418; src/routes/api/[...path]/handlers/system/system-shared.ts:66-83 |
?tenantId= may differ from the session tenant only for super-admin; otherwise 403. |
Does it fail closed?
- Missing tenant at the hook: no.
src/hooks/handle-authentication.ts:1117initialiseslocals.tenantId = nulland continues; no hook rejects a tenantless request. - Invalid tenant: no validation at all.
isValidTenantId()exists (src/utils/tenant.server.ts:91-94) but is called only from the compilation path (src/utils/compilation/compile.ts:200).grep -rn "isValidTenantId" srcreturns exactly those two hits. An unknown host label becomes a brand-new empty tenant scope rather than an error. - First real gate is the DB layer:
src/utils/security/safe-query.ts:78-98throwsTENANT_CONTEXT_MISSINGonly whentenantIdisundefinedor""(:86-90);nullis treated as the explicit global scope (:72-76comment,:87-89), which is whyassertTenantContextalone cannot stop a tenantless request from reading/writing the global layer. - API-boundary gates exist per handler, not centrally:
src/routes/api/[...path]/handlers/media.ts:152-155,handlers/system/system-transfer.ts:51-53and:83-85,handlers/system/system-shared.ts:54-59,handlers/system/system-ai.ts:142. - Media file delivery does fail closed:
src/routes/files/[...path]/+server.ts:486-499rejects whenMULTI_TENANTis on andlocals.tenantIdis missing or does not match the path tenant.
2. Capability matrix
| Capability | Status | Implementation (file:line) | Enforcement points | Existing tests | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Per-request tenant resolution | partial | src/hooks/handle-authentication.ts:1197-1208; src/utils/tenant.ts:35-48 |
hooks.server.ts:813-834 pipeline; request-tenant.ts:23-35 test override |
tests/unit/hooks/request-tenant.test.ts; tests/unit/multi-tenancy/00-tenant-utils.test.ts |
Hooks never reject a tenantless or unknown tenant (handle-authentication.ts:1117, tenant.ts:47). No registry lookup validates the host-derived id. |
| CRUD adapter guard (core) | complete | src/databases/crud-tenant-guard.ts:185-334; installed at src/databases/db.ts:265 (replicas too: :340, :477) |
assertTenantContext on every op (crud-tenant-guard.ts:53-67); body tenantId mismatch → 500 TENANT_MISMATCH (:41-51, :81-108); batch variants :114-179 |
tests/unit/multi-tenancy/crud-tenant-guard.test.ts:62-113; crud-tenant-guard-batch.test.ts:35-73; tests/unit/security/tenant-isolation-matrix.test.ts:160-200 |
Guard is built once at boot and re-checks isMultiTenantMode() per call; if the settings cache flips to false for 5 s the whole guard becomes a pass-through (crud-tenant-guard.ts:191, :349). |
| Domain namespaces (auth/content/media/collection/system) | complete | src/databases/crud-tenant-guard.ts:341-378; wrapped at src/databases/db.ts:267-288 |
Last-arg options bag checked via enforceOptionsSync (:363-372); unbranded bypass impossible (system-tenant-scope.ts:94-98) |
tests/unit/multi-tenancy/crud-tenant-guard.test.ts:123-153; tests/unit/multi-tenancy/create-user-session-scope.test.ts:52-64 |
Namespaces whose methods take no options bag are left unwrapped (crud-tenant-guard.ts:369) — tenant scope then depends on the data payload only. |
Request-bound adapter injection (forTenant) |
complete | src/databases/tenant-adapter.ts:62-137 |
crud/auth/content/media/collection/system/batch/fts proxied (:83-94); explicit tenantId never overwritten (:71-73); 100-entry cap (:60, :131-134) |
tests/unit/databases/tenant-adapter.test.ts:20-52; tests/unit/sdk/sdk-fixes-audit.test.ts:120-135 |
Injection only happens when a tenant was resolved (:153); the fallback branch hands out the raw adapter (:157). |
| REST collection read/write | complete | src/routes/api/[...path]/+server.ts:383-418; handlers under src/routes/api/[...path]/handlers/ |
Dispatcher tenant + locals.dbAdapter; ?tenantId= super-admin only (:412-418) |
tests/integration/databases/tenant-isolation.test.ts:123-174; tests/integration/api/collections-mutations.test.ts; tests/e2e/multi-tenancy/isolation.spec.ts:179-360 |
The integration assertion is permissive: it accepts 200 **or** 401 (tenant-isolation.test.ts:157) and skips the leak check entirely when the status is not 200 (:158-161). |
| GraphQL collection queries | complete | src/routes/api/graphql/resolvers/collections.ts:512-552 |
Server tenant vs context tenant → throw (:538-543); user tenant vs context tenant → throw (:546-552); bypassTenantIsolation only set server-side |
tests/unit/graphql/multi-tenancy-isolation.test.ts:72-221 |
Check runs only if (isMultiTenantEnabled()) (:540); a 5 s flag miss disables it. ctx.bypassTenantIsolation (:529, :546) is read from context with no provenance check. |
| GraphQL media queries | partial | src/routes/api/graphql/resolvers/media.ts:100-117 |
media:read RBAC (:94-96); filter.tenantId added only when context.tenantId is truthy (:103-105) |
none found (grep -rn "mediaImages\|mediaDocuments" tests → no tenant assertion) |
The query relies on the bound adapter to inject tenantId into the options bag (+server.ts:1090, :1118); the explicit filter.tenantId silently disappears when ctx.tenantId is null (media.ts:103). |
| GraphQL data operations (export / import / backup / migration / sync) | complete (fixed) | src/routes/api/graphql/resolvers/data-operations.ts:346-367 (resolveGraphQLTenant) |
Every one of the 15 data-operation fields that accept tenantId resolves it through resolveGraphQLTenant: a caller-supplied value may differ from the session tenant only for super-admin; a multi-tenant deployment with no session tenant throws. |
tests/unit/api/graphql-tenant-scope.test.ts (7 cases, incl. the former contentExportRun hole and fail-closed tenantless case) |
The gate covers the 15 fields that accept tenantId; resolvers outside that set keep their own checks. Single-tenant behaviour is unchanged. |
Local SDK / LocalCMS |
partial | src/services/sdk/index.ts:102-135 (default tenant/user binding); :225-230 |
Defaults merged only when caller omits tenantId (:134-135); media namespace fails closed (src/services/sdk/namespaces/media-namespace.ts:141-144, :186-188, :224-226) |
tests/integration/sdk/local-cms.test.ts; tests/unit/sdk/sdk-hardening.test.ts |
A caller-supplied tenantId always wins (index.ts:106-107); the SDK therefore trusts its caller, and the only backstop is the adapter guard. |
| Relationships / populate / joins | complete | src/services/sdk/namespaces/populate-resolver.ts:160-162, :245-254 |
Relation reads carry the caller’s tenant (:251); system scope only when the relation read is tenantless (:252-254); relation cache keys tenant-prefixed (:190, :267) |
tests/unit/sdk/populate-policy.test.ts; tests/unit/sdk/relation-filter.test.ts |
— |
Media / asset delivery (/files/*) |
complete | src/routes/files/[...path]/+server.ts:486-499 |
Path tenant vs locals.tenantId (:488-498); signed-URL check after the gate (:505-510); transforms only after both (:532-534) |
tests/unit/hooks/file-server-tenant.test.ts:85-247 (25 cases) |
A principal whose tenantId is literally "global" bypasses every tenant directory (:492) — deliberate, but the value comes from locals, and the WS/plugin paths can mint "default"/"global" (hooks.ws.ts:261, plugins/[pluginId]/+server.ts:87). |
| Search / FTS indexing | not-found | src/databases/postgresql/fts-adapter.ts:321-329, :445-453 (tenant clause options?.tenantId ?? core.currentTenantId at :323, :447); src/databases/mariadb/fts-adapter.ts:155-168 (buildRawTenantClause from options only) |
No assertTenantContext in either adapter; PostgreSQL falls back to the mutable currentTenantId, MariaDB drops the predicate when options is absent |
tests/unit/databases/postgresql-fts-adapter.test.ts (no tenant case) |
No request-path caller exists: grep -rnw "fts" src outside src/databases returns 0 hits, so IFtsAdapter (db-interface.ts:1074, :1635; exposed at :1667) is an unwired capability. If wired as written, a missing options.tenantId on PostgreSQL runs under whichever tenant set context last (core/tenant-pool-manager.ts:41-59); on MariaDB it silently reads the global scope. |
| Bulk ops / batch | partial | src/databases/core/batch-module.ts:60-83, :250-278, :395-397 |
Mixed-tenant batch rejected (:60-83); applyTenantFilter per operation (:278, :397) |
tests/unit/databases/batch-module.test.ts; tests/integration/databases/bulk-operations-contract.test.ts |
batch is proxied by forTenant (tenant-adapter.ts:89-91) but is not in the boot-time namespace guard list (db.ts:267), so a db.batch obtained from a raw adapter has no assertTenantContext of its own. |
| Export / import (REST) | partial | src/routes/api/[...path]/handlers/system/system-transfer.ts:44-71, :76-99; src/routes/api/migration/import/+server.ts:122-128 |
TENANT_REQUIRED for export/import (system-transfer.ts:51-53, :83-85) |
tests/unit/api/export-import-security.test.ts |
Migration import has no tenant gate: it requires only config:collectionbuilder (migration/import/+server.ts:52-56) and forwards locals.tenantId ?? null (:128), which the guard reads as the global scope (safe-query.ts:87-89). |
| Background jobs (queue) | partial | src/services/background/jobs/job-queue-service.ts:94-121 |
tenantId is optional in the signature (:97) and copied into the job row (:116); under MULTI_TENANT the guarded system.jobs.create throws when it is absent |
tests/unit/routes/queue-actions.server.test.ts |
Fail-closed only via the namespace guard’s “last object arg is options” heuristic (crud-tenant-guard.ts:369-371) — the tenant is in the payload, not an options bag, so the guard reads jobData.tenantId by accident of shape. |
| Scheduled jobs | complete | src/services/scheduler.ts:310-314 |
forTenant(rawDb, job.tenantId) per job (:311), tenant passed to the workflow gate (:314, :328) |
tests/unit/scripts/* (no scheduler-tenant case) |
Jobs without tenantId run against the raw adapter (:311 ternary). |
| Webhooks / outbox | partial | src/services/background/webhook-service.ts:127-136, :175-194; src/services/outbox/outbox-service.ts:177-185, :229-239 |
Outbox fails closed on undefined/"" under MT (:233-239); webhook list is fetched per tenant (webhook-service.ts:184) |
tests/unit/api/webhook-security.test.ts; tests/unit/api/webhook-logs.test.ts |
Missing tenant degrades to "global" instead of failing: webhook-service.ts:132, :144, :175, :183. A tenantless request therefore dispatches the global webhook set. |
| Caches | complete | src/databases/cache/cache-service.ts:494-506; src/services/cache/response-cache.ts:642-643 |
tenant:<id>: key prefix (cache-service.ts:505); response-cache key prefix ${tenantId \|\| "default"} (response-cache.ts:643) |
tests/unit/databases/cache-service.test.ts; tests/unit/core/response-cache-read-after-write.test.ts |
null/undefined tenant collapses to the shared "default" namespace (cache-service.ts:189-190, :502), so every tenantless request shares one bucket. |
| Sessions | partial | src/databases/core/relational-auth.ts:719-793; src/databases/auth/session-manager.ts:9-11 |
Tenant predicate added only when options.tenantId !== undefined (relational-auth.ts:737-744, :767-773) |
tests/unit/databases/relational-auth-session-tenant-isolation.test.ts; tests/unit/databases/relational-auth-validate-session-tenant-isolation.test.ts; tests/unit/auth/sessions/session-user.test.ts |
With no options.tenantId, validateSession uses the noTenant SQL plan (:744) — any tenant’s session id validates. session-manager.ts:9-11 states the tenant check is the caller’s responsibility. |
| Collaboration / WebSocket | partial | src/hooks.ws.ts:238-261, :298-301, :314 |
Profile tenant vs connection tenant rejected (:298-304); Yjs docs keyed by tenant (src/routes/api/collaboration/yjs/+server.ts:50, :60, :80) |
tests/unit/routes/collaboration-yjs-server.test.ts |
Falls back to "default" when nothing resolves (hooks.ws.ts:261, :314) instead of rejecting. |
| Generated URLs / filesystem paths | partial | src/utils/path-resolver.ts:56-62, :69-72, :78-83 |
requireCollections() throws without context (:69-72, context.ts:46-52); media dir is mediaFolder/<tenant> (:82) |
tests/unit/multi-tenancy/tenant-normalization.test.ts |
getMedia() falls back to .../global when no tenant is in the ALS store (path-resolver.ts:82). sveltyContext is seeded with a tenantId in exactly one place — handle-authentication.ts:1798-1804; the outer runWithContext at hooks.server.ts:1126-1130 sets only requestId/abortSignal. |
| Public theme endpoint | partial | src/routes/api/theme/public/+server.ts:44-63 |
Tenant from ?tenantId=, ?hostname=, or the request host (:44-52); "default" rejected (:61) |
tests/unit/routes/theme-public-server.test.ts |
Unauthenticated and fully caller-selected: any caller can enumerate tenant ids and read each tenant’s branding (:44-49). |
| Plugin API routes | partial | src/routes/api/plugins/[pluginId]/+server.ts:36-43, :87-90 |
Plugin state cached per pluginId:tenantId (:37) |
tests/unit/routes/plugins-api-server.test.ts |
locals.tenantId ?? "default" (:87) — a tenantless request is served the default tenant’s plugin state instead of being rejected. |
| Lint guard (static) | complete | scripts/lint/lint-tenant-api.ts:9-19, :38-71 |
Bans positional tenantId on media/content/auth adapters (:244, :297), bans bypassTenantCheck: true outside a 31-entry allowlist (:38-71), requires the brand exports (:381, :403, :411) |
tests/unit/scripts/lint-tenant-scope.test.ts:18-66; wired into test:tenant (package.json:158) |
Allowlist is broad enough to include handlers/auth.ts, tenant-adapter.ts, mongo-db-adapter.ts, scheduled-jobs.ts, media-namespace.ts and populate-resolver.ts (:57, :50, :51, :64, :66, :67) — bypasses in exactly the files that matter most are legal by construction. |
| PostgreSQL Row-Level Security | opt-in, wired | src/databases/postgresql/adapter-core.ts:2231-2298 (policy + read-back), :2191-2211 (GUC) |
DDL exists but is never called — see §3. The method now fails closed after the DDL when the policy cannot filter | none enables RLS: grep -rIn "\brls\b" tests → 2 hits, both asserting relrowsecurity = false (tests/integration/databases/tenant-pool-isolation.test.ts:210-214) |
enforceTenantPolicy has no production caller: grep -rn "enforceTenantPolicy" src → the interface declaration (db-interface.ts:1703) and the implementation only. No table gets ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY. |
3. Is PostgreSQL Row-Level Security actually implemented?
It is now wired as an opt-in mode (TENANT_RLS_ENABLED, off by default) and still fails closed: after the DDL it reads back the catalog and refuses to report success when the policy cannot filter. The default request path remains the application predicate, because a FORCE policy with an unbound context hides every row — see the prerequisites in multi-tenancy.
| Piece | Status | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Policy DDL | present, fails closed | adapter-core.ts:2249 ALTER TABLE ... ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY (deliberately not FORCE — see :2244-2248); :2257-2259 DROP POLICY IF EXISTS + CREATE POLICY tenant_isolation ... USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true)). :2272-2292 reads back relrowsecurity / relforcerowsecurity / ownership from pg_class and throws when RLS did not enable, or when the connecting role owns the table without FORCE (an owner bypasses its own policies). |
| Session GUC | present, unreachable on the request path | adapter-core.ts:2191-2211. setTenantContext() writes app.tenant_id only when it is handed a transaction-scoped client (isLocal = Boolean(sql), :2209) or finds a per-tenant pool (:2206-2208). The request path passes neither: applyAdapterTenantContext calls it with the tenant argument only (tenant-adapter.ts:183), and getTenantPool()/setTenantPool() have zero callers outside their own definitions. So exec is undefined and the method returns before set_config (:2208) for every non-transactional query. |
| Transaction-local context | present | transaction-module.ts:189-191: set_config('app.tenant_id', <tenant>, true) batched with statement_timeout in one round trip; the third argument true makes it transaction-local. |
| Pool routing | present, connection-level only | getSql() (postgresql/adapter-core.ts:1490-1515; tenant branch :1500-1502): when currentTenantId is set, queries go to that tenant’s pool. postgresql/tenant-pool.ts:24-58 creates that pool from DATABASE_URL — the same database, so this is connection partitioning, not data isolation. Real DSN isolation only via setTenantPool() (adapter-core.ts:2368), which no boot path calls. |
| Policy creation call site | wired (opt-in) | grep -rn "enforceTenantPolicy" src scripts tests returns: the interface member (db-interface.ts:1703), the implementation (adapter-core.ts:2231), a shape assertion in tests/integration/databases/health-contract.test.ts, and docs. createModel() invokes it when TENANT_RLS_ENABLED=true (src/databases/postgresql/adapter-core.ts, after provisionPostgresTable) and throws when the policy cannot filter. |
| Tests | dedicated suite | re-verified 2026-11-11: grep -rIn "\brls\b" src scripts tests → 2 hits, both in tests/integration/databases/tenant-pool-isolation.test.ts:210-214, which asserts relrowsecurity = false (it guards the test’s own premise). Isolation without RLS is proven by tests/integration/databases/tenant-pool-isolation.test.ts (pool of one, stale session GUC, IDOR read/write, concurrency). RLS-on-tables is proven by tests/integration/databases/tenant-rls-request-path.test.ts: FORCE + policy provisioning from createModel(), a non-owner role seeing only its bound tenant (unbound → zero rows), cross-tenant writes rejected, one connection reused across tenants, and concurrent tenants that never cross scopes. |
Consequence. Every isolation guarantee on PostgreSQL comes from the application-level WHERE "tenantId" = ? predicate (applyFilterAndOptions(), src/databases/core/sql-query-builder.ts:1367, tenant predicate :1422-1435; applyTenantFilter()/applyTenantFilterToObject() in src/databases/core/relational-utils.ts:989-1010; buildRawTenantClause() :1131-1162). The database has no second line of defence. Even after wiring enforceTenantPolicy, the GUC would only be bound inside an explicit db.transaction() (transaction-module.ts:188-197), because the non-transactional path never reaches set_config — so a plain findMany would still run with app.tenant_id unset and the policy would compare against NULL (hiding every row).
Documentation drift (corrected 2026-11-11). docs/reference/architecture/multi-tenancy.mdx previously stated that enforceTenantPolicy() “is called once” when a collection is provisioned and described per-request app.tenant_id on the shared pool. Neither held; the section is now labelled an opt-in, unwired primitive and keeps the accurate technical detail. docs/project/achievements-2026.mdx no longer claims “per-request SET SESSION app.tenant_id“.
4. Existing automated coverage
Suites: bun run test:tenant = lint:tenant + 4 files / 59 tests (package.json:158, measured 2026-11-11); bun run test:tenant:integration = tests/integration/databases/tenant-isolation.test.ts (package.json:159); bun run test:security = 21 files (package.json:146).
| Test file | Enforcement point exercised | What it asserts |
|---|---|---|
tests/unit/security/tenant-isolation-matrix.test.ts |
safe-query, media/auth/content entries, system scope |
29 cases (12 generated from the operation matrix): missing tenant throws per entry point (:38, :176), branded scope allowed (:49, :181), forged scope rejected (:67, :73), demo implies isolation (:58), tenant-A filter cannot match tenant-B rows (:93, :122, :145), bulk update/delete fail closed (:188), MT-off passes through (:208). |
tests/unit/security/safe-query-manual.test.ts |
assertTenantContext, safeQuery |
13 cases: undefined throws (:67, :119), null accepted as global (:48), no object clone on bypass (:33), system scope honoured (:91, :99), single-tenant no-op (:74, :134). |
tests/unit/security/system-tenant-scope.test.ts |
brand registry | 7 cases: only createSystemTenantScope output passes (:31), plain look-alikes rejected (:38, :64), survives duplicated module instances (:70). |
tests/unit/multi-tenancy/crud-tenant-guard.test.ts |
createTenantGuardedCrud / Namespace |
10 cases: find/insert throw without tenant (:63, :72), explicit tenant allowed (:79), options tenant copied into data (:84), existing tenant preserved (:93), bypass mode passes through (:115), namespace requires options bag (:133, :143), MT-off passes (:156). |
tests/unit/multi-tenancy/crud-tenant-guard-batch.test.ts |
batch write variants | options tenant copied into insertMany/upsertMany rows; mismatched body tenant throws (:35-73). |
tests/unit/multi-tenancy/create-user-session-scope.test.ts |
auth namespace guard | user/session creation accepted only with a branded system scope (:52-64). |
tests/unit/multi-tenancy/physical-pool-partitioning.test.ts |
setTenantContext, pool map |
pool chosen per tenant, null tenant clears routing (:60, :116, :135). |
tests/unit/multi-tenancy/collections-migration.test.ts |
tenant config dirs | migrateToMultiTenant moves .ts files from the flat dir into the tenant dir (:14, :33), skips existing (:63), ignores non-.ts (:82), runFullMigration (:108). |
tests/unit/multi-tenancy/00-tenant-utils.test.ts, tenant-normalization.test.ts |
utils/tenant, path helpers |
hostname derivation, normalization, reserved subdomains. |
tests/unit/databases/tenant-adapter.test.ts |
forTenant |
bound adapter reused per (adapter, tenant) (:21), system scope passes through (:32), explicit tenant untouched (:43). |
tests/unit/databases/tenant-pool-manager.test.ts |
TenantPoolManager |
acquisition, idle eviction, in-flight protection, close-all. |
tests/unit/databases/relational-auth-session-tenant-isolation.test.ts / relational-auth-validate-session-tenant-isolation.test.ts |
session delete/validate | tenant-scoped deletes and validation do not touch another tenant’s rows. |
tests/unit/graphql/multi-tenancy-isolation.test.ts |
collection resolvers | context/server tenant mismatch throws (:72), user/context mismatch throws (:111), unauthenticated query rejected (:146), matching tenant scoped (:174), global admin bypass (:222). |
tests/unit/hooks/file-server-tenant.test.ts |
/files/* gate |
25 cases across MT-off, matching, non-matching, missing tenant, global bypass, global-scoped files, edge paths (:61-247). |
tests/unit/hooks/request-tenant.test.ts |
resolveRequestTenant |
header honoured only in test mode, charset and "null" rejection, session fallback. |
tests/unit/scripts/lint-tenant-scope.test.ts |
lint rules | flags unconditional system scope (:19, :28), allows conditional spread (:36), honours suppression (:52), scans Svelte blocks (:60). |
tests/integration/databases/tenant-isolation.test.ts |
end-to-end REST A-vs-B | marker written under A is absent from B’s list; a cross-tenant read must be 401/403, or 200 with an explicitly empty tenant-B slice (the old 200 or 401 acceptance was removed). |
tests/integration/databases/tenant-pool-isolation.test.ts |
pool-of-one adversarial isolation | alternating/concurrent A/B reads, IDOR guessed ids, a stale session app.tenant_id, and a failed statement on the reused connection; also asserts isolation comes from the predicate, not RLS. |
tests/unit/api/graphql-tenant-scope.test.ts |
GraphQL data-operation tenant gate | foreign tenantId rejected for tenant admin and plain user, allowed for super-admin, session fallback, fail-closed tenantless multi-tenant case, single-tenant unchanged. |
tests/e2e/multi-tenancy/isolation.spec.ts |
browser-level | 5 scenarios: listing blocked (:179), entry access blocked (:228), media isolation (:300), same-tenant works (:361), global resources shared (:426). |
Not in any targeted suite (they run only inside the full unit run): tenant-adapter.test.ts, crud-tenant-guard-batch.test.ts, tenant-pool-manager.test.ts, physical-pool-partitioning.test.ts, graphql/multi-tenancy-isolation.test.ts, and the relational-auth-*tenant-isolation* pair. test:tenant lists exactly four files (package.json:158) — 29 + 13 + 7 + 10 = 59 tests.
5. Prioritised missing data-safety tests
Each case is written so it fails on the branch it was written against — that is the point of adding it. Items 1 and 5 have since shipped (their rows above are marked fixed); they are retained as the acceptance criteria that the new tests pin.
1. GraphQL data operations must reject a foreign tenantId argument (shipped)
- Precondition:
MULTI_TENANT=true; logged-in non-admin user oftenant-a; a collectionpostswith a row owned bytenant-b. - Action:
mutation { contentExportRun(collections:["posts"], tenantId:"tenant-b") { manifest } }against/api/graphql. - Expected behaviour (now implemented): 403 (or GraphQL error), and no
tenant-bcontent in the response.resolveGraphQLTenant()(data-operations.ts:346-367) rejects a differing tenant for anyone belowsuper-admin, and a multi-tenant deployment with no session tenant throws. Pinned bytests/unit/api/graphql-tenant-scope.test.ts. - Also covered: the same resolver gate is applied to every data-operation field that accepts
tenantId(the 15 fields); other resolvers keep their own checks. - Suggested file:
tests/unit/api/graphql-tenant-scope.test.ts.
2. Provisioning a collection must enable and be able to prove PostgreSQL RLS
- Precondition: PostgreSQL adapter,
MULTI_TENANT=true, connected as the table owner. - Action: create collection
rls_probe, then querySELECT relrowsecurity FROM pg_class WHERE relname='collection_rlsprobe'andSELECT polname FROM pg_policy. - Expected failure mode (still open):
relrowsecurity = trueand atenant_isolationpolicy exists is the correct end state, but it is not reachable today:relrowsecurity = falseandpg_policyis empty, becauseenforceTenantPolicyhas no caller (adapter-core.ts:2231, interface atdb-interface.ts:1703). Calling it directly now fails closed (owner-bypass read-back) rather than reporting success. - Suggested file:
tests/integration/databases/tenant-rls-wiring.test.ts(skip unlessDB_TYPE=postgresql).
3. A tenantless request must be rejected at the HTTP boundary, not written to the global layer
- Precondition:
MULTI_TENANT=true; authenticated admin; request to a bare two-label host (cms.example.com) sogetTenantIdFromHostnamereturnsnull(tenant.ts:47) and no session tenant is present. - Action:
POST /api/collections/postswith a valid body and no?tenantId=. - Expected failure mode:
400 TENANT_REQUIRED, andSELECT count(*) FROM collection_posts WHERE "tenantId" IS NULLunchanged. Today the hook leaves the tenant null (handle-authentication.ts:1117,:1201), the raw adapter is exposed (tenant-adapter.ts:157), andassertTenantContextacceptsnullas the global scope (safe-query.ts:87-89), so the row can be written withtenantId NULL— the layer every other tenantless request can read. - Suggested file:
tests/integration/api/tenantless-write-fails-closed.test.ts.
4. Full-text search must not inherit the ambient tenant of another request
- Precondition:
MULTI_TENANT=true; two tenants with identical titles; adapterftsavailable. - Action:
applyAdapterTenantContext(db, "tenant-a"), thenapplyAdapterTenantContext(db, "tenant-b"), then calldb.fts.search(collection, query)withoutoptions.tenantId. - Expected failure mode: either throw
TENANT_CONTEXT_MISSING, or run with the caller’s tenant — never withtenant-b. Today the PostgreSQL clause is built fromoptions?.tenantId ?? core.currentTenantId(postgresql/fts-adapter.ts:323,:447) andcurrentTenantIdis mutable adapter state (core/tenant-pool-manager.ts:41-59), so the search runs under whichever tenant set context last. MariaDB builds the predicate fromoptionsonly (mariadb/fts-adapter.ts:155-168), so the equivalent failure there is a dropped predicate (a global read), not a stale tenant. Add the converse case: two interleaved requests must not cross. - Suggested file:
tests/unit/databases/fts-tenant-context.test.ts.
5. An integration leak assertion must not accept “200 or 401” as a pass (shipped)
- Precondition:
MULTI_TENANT=true; marker row seeded undertenant-a; admin session;x-test-tenant-id: tenant-b. - Action:
GET /api/collections/<coll>?publicationFilter=allas tenant B. - Expected behaviour (now implemented): exactly
200and the marker absent; if the request is unauthenticated it must be401, and the test fails rather than skips. The former permissive assertion intenant-isolation.test.tsaccepted both statuses and only checked the body on 200; it now requires 401/403, or 200 with an explicitly empty tenant-B slice, and a DB-less run skips with a reason. - Suggested file: keep
tests/integration/databases/tenant-isolation.test.tstight, plus the same assertion for GraphQL (/api/graphql).
6. Known bypass inventory (for reviewers)
| # | Path | What it permits | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Mutation *(... tenantId: String) in GraphQL data operations |
Read/export/backup/sync another tenant by argument — closed: resolveGraphQLTenant() rejects a differing tenant below super-admin |
data-operations.ts:346-367; tests/unit/api/graphql-tenant-scope.test.ts |
| 2 | ?tenantId= on /api/* and /api/system/* |
Cross-tenant for super-admin only (intended) |
+server.ts:412-418; system-shared.ts:74-79 |
| 3 | locals.tenantId === "global" on /files/* |
Read any tenant’s media directory | files/[...path]/+server.ts:492 |
| 4 | Tenantless write on a two-label host | Row written with tenantId NULL (global layer) |
handle-authentication.ts:1201; safe-query.ts:87-89 |
| 5 | Ambient currentTenantId in FTS |
Query scoped to the last request’s tenant | postgresql/fts-adapter.ts:323; tenant-pool-manager.ts:41 |
| 6 | tenantId \|\| "global" fallbacks |
Tenantless request served the global webhook/collaboration set | webhook-service.ts:132, :183; hooks.ws.ts:261 |
| 7 | locals.tenantId ?? "default" |
Tenantless request served default tenant’s plugin state |
plugins/[pluginId]/+server.ts:87 |
| 8 | validateSession noTenant plan |
Session validated without any tenant predicate | relational-auth.ts:737-744 |
| 9 | Migration import with null tenant | Import written into the global layer by a non-admin config:collectionbuilder holder |
migration/import/+server.ts:52-56, :128 |